Monday, July 22, 2024

Wild in the Streets


 

What do Vladimir Putin, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Xi Jinping, Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden have in common?  Each of them (with the exception of Donald Trump, who did, and may again) lead very powerful countries.  And the leadership of each has been tarnished by controversy, generally characterized by their exhibiting a reluctance to cede power but, in the more extreme cases, engaging in and/or supporting brutal acts of terrorism and oppression: against neighboring countries, political opponents, and even the general population in their own countries.  But these men all have something else in common:  They are all over 70 years old.  Four of them are “Baby Boomers”, meaning that they were children or teenagers in the 1960s, and Biden, while technically too old to be counted as a Baby Boomer, also entered the 1960s as a teenager.  (Ali Khamenei just misses this benchmark, as he was born in 1939.) 


(A note:  When I started writing this article, Joe Biden was still tenaciously resisting growing calls from his fellow Democrats to end his candidacy for reelection to America’s presidency.  He has finally done so, while lending his endorsement to Vice President Kamala Harris, who, while much younger than him, is a Baby Boomer.) 

The irony here is that the youth of the 1960s – at least in America – became famous for opposing their elders, and a popular slogan among them at the time was “Don’t trust anybody over 30.”  They flouted standards and conventions, organized marches and protests, and genuinely scared those who held the reins of power.  Songs by popular musical artists of the time openly espoused revolution – even violent revolution, such as “Street Fighting Man” by the Rolling Stones, and “Something in the Air” by Thunderclap Newman.  Other musical groups, however, expressed cynicism about violent revolution, most notably the Beatles, in their song, “Revolution”, which had the lyrics “But if you want money for people that minds that hate, all I can tell you brother, you have to wait” and “But if you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao, you ain’t going to make it with anyone anyhow”.  The Who, as well, expressed cynicism in their revolutionary song, “Won’t Get Fooled Again” with the (prescient) lyrics, “Meet the new boss . . . same as the old boss”.

Growing terror among the older generations of the restive “hippie” youth was finally given full expression in 1968 in a now long-forgotten movie, Wild in the Streets.   At the center of this film is a rock star, Max Frost, who fronts a band named the Troopers.  An ambitious senator (played by Hal Holbrook), hoping to capitalize on Frost’s popularity among younger voters, invites Max and his band to perform at one of his rallies.  But Max Frost turns the tables and uses the opportunity to promote a revolutionary movement that begins with a call to lower the voting age.  The senator, still believing that he can use Max to advance his own political ambitions, supports the movement, and the voting age is lowered from 21 to 15.  The new teen voting block eventually succeeds in getting Max elected president, and he eventually abandons those among the older generation in Congress (referred to as the “Old Guard”’ by Max) who were still hoping to work with him in a way that would serve their ends as well.  The mandatory retirement age is set at 30, and anyone over 35 is arrested and sent to “re-education camps” where they are permanently dosed on LSD.  This successful youth revolution in the United States inspires identical revolutions in the other major countries of the world.  The movie ends with the 24-year-old Max Frost facing an uncertain future, however, as an even younger generation clamors for more power of their own. 


The fictional band Max and the Troopers actually had a bona fide hit record, in their rousing rock-and-roll anthem “Nothing Can Change the Shape of Things to Come”.  (If I recall, my sister actually owned it, because I remember hearing it being played on her record player.)  The lyrics, rather than calling for revolution, simply asserted that it was inevitable:

 

There's a new sun

Risin' up angry in the sky

And there's a new voice

Sayin' "we're not afraid to die"

 

Let the old world make believe

It's blind and deaf and dumb

But nothing can change the shape of things to come

 

There are changes

Lyin' ahead in every road

And there are new thoughts

Ready and waiting to explode

 

When tomorrow is today

The bells may toll for some

But nothing can change the shape of things to come

 

The future's comin' in, now

Sweet and strong

Ain't no-one gonna hold it back for long

 

There are new dreams

Crowdin' out old realities

There's revolution

Sweepin' in like a fresh new breeze

 

Let the old world make believe

It's blind and deaf and dumb

 

(But) nothing can change the shape of things

To come

 

Looking back, one can see that the fears of a youth-led revolution were overblown, but the youth of that generation eventually did take over the reins of power – often after they had become older than their former adversaries – and those of that generation at the pinnacle of power now are holding onto it with a vice-like grip.  In some ways, they seem like ugly caricatures of the “Old Guard” that they were railing against in the 1960s.

And I can’t help but wonder if what this country – and the world – really needs today is a true-life version of Max Frost, to lead a revolution of the young vs. the old.  (Or, since some of the world leaders seem to be particularly hard on women in their policies and practices, maybe a Maxine Frost, leading a feminist-youth revolt.)  We have certainly seen noble attempts at this outside of the United States, such as the periodic anti-Putin uprisings in Russia that began with the Dissenters’ March in 2006, the Hong Kong protests of 2019-2020 which arose in response to increasingly autocratic behavior by the government of mainland China, and the widespread protest in Iran that began in September 2022 after an Iranian woman was arrested by the “morality police” for not covering her hair and who then died while in police custody.  And yet, here in America, the younger generation has been conspicuously quiescent, at least when it comes to criticizing or protesting this country’s older generation of leaders.  Granted, the “Old Guard” leadership in America is not nearly as draconian as that of Putin’s Russia, Xi’s China, or Khamenei’s Iran.  But the danger seems increasingly ever-present that, unless things change, American democracy could be at risk in the very near future.


I think that many would blame this on the very character of our crop of college-aged youth, colloquially known as “Generation Z”.  Mollycoddled by helicopter parents as children, and then psychologically crippled by a too-early exposure to smart phones and social media, these “snowflake” youth are often perceived by their elders as simply unfit to hold any positions of responsibility, or to take on any significant challenge.  I wonder, though, if we’re giving up on them too soon.  There was another “lost generation” of youth, who were raised as children in the “Jazz Age” of the 1920s: an era when Prohibition incited criminal behavior and the glamorization of gangsters, moral codes were openly flouted in speakeasies and jazz clubs, and religion seemed to be withering in the face of scientific assaults, as in the famous Scopes Monkey Trial of 1925, where attorney Clarence Darrow championed the teaching of evolution in the classroom by holding the opposing attorney’s religious beliefs up to ridicule.  One could imagine that it would be difficult for any children brought up in that decade to have a moral compass, or any good character at all.  But those kids, after being hardened in the Great Depression of the 1930s, and called into public service in the 1940s to join the war effort against the Axis Powers in World War II, are remembered today as the Greatest Generation: a generation of heroes of the highest order.  So I think it is very premature to write off Generation Z as a “lost generation”.  Their youth might surprise us, and in a very good way.  And if the younger generations here in America take up political activism on a scale comparable to the protesters in the 1960s, then perhaps, as happened in the Wild in the Streets movie, this will embolden youth throughout the world to push their own protests to successful outcomes.  


I just hope that if our youth do finally assert themselves, they don’t go to the extremes that Max Frost and his followers did to drive their elders out of power.  And I especially hope that it won’t take a crisis of the order of the Great Depression, or World War II, to rouse them out of their apathetic slumber and stir them into action.

Tuesday, July 16, 2024

Creative Evolution

 




Recently a member of my book club sent around, to me and the other members, an excerpt from a poem by Henry David Thoreau which he found particularly moving.  It read:

 

I witness a beauty in the form or coloring of the clouds which addresses itself to my imagination... You tell me it is a mass of vapor which absorbs all other rays and reflects the red, but that is nothing, for this red vision excites me, stirs my blood, makes my thoughts flow... If there is not something mystical in your explanation, something unexplainable to the understanding, some elements of mystery, it is quite insufficient.

 

Among the expressions of approval and admiration from the other members, one of these included an intriguing question:

 

After reading the above, would you be able to say unequivocally, that a human wrote it? If not, how would an AI [artificial intelligence] be able to generate that text? And if it generates the text, does it possess the sentiment? How do you know?

 

And this prompted another member to write:

 

Thoreau's words resonate with a profound appreciation for the beauty and mystery inherent in nature. His ability to see beyond the scientific explanation of the clouds' formation and delve into the emotional and mystical impact of their appearance reveals a deep connection between the external world and the inner realm of imagination.  In a world often dominated by scientific explanations, he reminds us of the importance of embracing the mystical and unexplainable elements that contribute to the richness of our experiences with nature.

 

But he quickly added that these remarks actually were generated by an artificial intelligence application (ChatGPT) that he had “asked” to express its opinions on that poem by Thoreau.  In reply, the other member who had posed the question said that this computer-generated response was something that she could have easily predicted.  I must confess that I was apparently much more impressed by this appraisal than she was, and could have been easily fooled by it, had the other member not confessed immediately to his deception.

 


This is just one example of how AI is and will increasingly be encroaching upon domains that were once considered to be exclusive to human beings.  Last April, an AI facsimile of the late comedian George Carlin was featured in a podcast titled “George Carlin: I’m glad I’m dead”.  The podcast featured AI-generated jokes in the style of Carlin’s comedy, done in a voice that sounded like his.  It was eventually removed after the Carlin estate filed a lawsuit on the grounds that the podcast had violated his estate’s copyright protections.

 

Comedy, of course, is an art form, and requires a nuanced understanding of what people find humorous, and what makes them laugh.  And on top of this, it is a very fickle art form, in that what is funny to some may be completely unfunny to others – even offensive and unpleasant.  As Louis Armstrong once said about music, “If it sounds good, it is good,” so too the test of genuinely good comedy is if people find it funny.  Is it really then possible for a computer to create comedy . . . to be funny?  On first blush it sounds absurd, but perhaps it actually is possible to use an analytic approach in order to distill the elements that make certain styles of comedy funny to certain audiences.  George Carlin’s style might even have been particularly amenable to this approach, since his comedy relied heavily upon wordplay.  And if it can be done for comedy, it doesn’t seem to be that much of a great leap to imagine computer-generated music, or visual art.  In fact, it is already being done.  Last March, an application called Suno, nicknamed “ChatGPT for music”, was launched, which can produce original music in response to textual prompts.  This was followed a few weeks later by a similar application named “Udio”.  And the Turkish-born artist Refik Anadol featured a successful exhibition in London this year that consisted of AI-generated images of natural landscapes.

 


In a blog entry that I posted more than ten years ago, “The New World Order?” (https://johnsemeraldtablet.blogspot.com/2013/05/the-new-world-order-in-my-occupation-as.html), I noted that as machines take on an increasing role in producing all of the necessaries of life, including food, it will become more and more challenging for human beings to find ways in which they can exchange things of value for what they need and desire.  I wrote:

 

In some ways, this actually does seem to be the trajectory that we are on.  In America, the proportion of manufacturing jobs has been steadily declining, while that of service jobs has increased, and a third type of employment, in which persons are compensated for thinking (e.g., as executives, consultants, accountants, engineers, and other professionals), has rapidly grown.  We seem to be moving toward a two-tiered society, in which “cognitive” employment and more skilled service jobs are well compensated (although, as satirized in movies such as Office Space, even these jobs can devolve into degrading, poorly paid lackey positions), while lower-level service and unskilled manufacturing jobs receive very meager wages.  And of course, our most successful entertainers – including professional athletes – are extremely well paid.  Another form of “entertainer”, the drug dealer, has become a prominent figure in the underclass and the underground economy (and those who control the production of these drugs are often at the heads of powerful private empires in foreign countries), while the less successful members of this group make up the huge prison population that is now a part of the American social system.  Other less successful and less powerful “entertainers”, such as strippers and prostitutes, lead lives that are only at one or two removes from those of prisoners and the destitute.

 

At that time, concerns about AI had not yet entered the general public conversation, and since then, intelligent machines have conspicuously moved beyond the manufacturing sector and have made strong inroads into the service sector as well.  But even beyond this, recent advances in AI have made it very plausible that jobs in the “cognitive” employment area could be taken over by machines as well.  And if this includes art and entertainment, then it really is becoming increasingly plausible that there will be little left of value that individual human beings can offer in return for the compensation that will allow them to procure the things that they want and need.  Even if some kind of technocratic socialism evolves where human beings do not have work to obtain the things that are produced by machines, this could still result in a very dystopian utopia, not unlike that featured in the 2008 animated feature film Wall-E, where overweight people spend their entire days sitting in comfortable recliner chairs, drinking soda pop in large cups while being entertained by video screens comfortably placed directly in front of them.

 


But setting this dismal scenario aside, there is a more depressing, fundamental question:  If computers will eventually be able to do just about everything that we can do, including producing works of art and entertainment – even if they can only produce effective simulations or imitations of these – then what, exactly, is it of fundamental value that human beings have brought to the universe as a result of their existence?  Will the final culmination of our civilization be the creation of lifeless machines that make our own existence superfluous, meaningless, . . . even unnecessary?  If our physical evolution and the consequent evolution of our civilization represent a sort of culmination of life on earth, then what did we evolve into?  What, then, does the word “evolution” even mean?

 

The theory of evolution, although considered a foundational element of biological science, has not been without controversy – even setting aside those perennial attacks raised by proponents of Creationism and “Intelligent Design” – as both the mechanisms and drivers have been debated and critiqued.  One fundamental criticism – raised, for example, in Norman Macbeth’s 1971 book Darwin Retried – is that the phrase often associated with Darwinism, “survival of the fittest” (which was actually coined by the philosopher Herbert Spencer, but with Darwin’s approval), is a meaningless tautology since, after all, the “fittest” by definition are those that survive.  I find this particular criticism to be rather lame, because one could argue, for example, that the phrase “those who are successful in their profession get promoted” is hollow on the grounds that the “professionally successful” are by definition those who get promoted.  Just as there are specific, identifiable, talents and behaviors that contribute to “professional success”, so too in biological ecosystems those organisms within a species that possess certain characteristics which better enable them to live long enough to reproduce are “more fit” for survival in a very meaningful sense of the word.  Nevertheless, while successful adaptation of species to their environments seems to be a critical component of the evolutionary process, I don’t think that this fully embodies the concept of “evolution” as it is generally understood, by both the scientific and the general community.  There is more to evolution than just developing the ability to thrive in one’s particular surroundings.

 

The evolutionary process involves an increase in complexity: a counter movement to the increase in entropy or disorder that comes about as a result of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  “Complexity”, however, is a term that defies simple definition, and has inspired a whole science of its own.  What does it mean for something to become more complex?  An evolving ecosystem seems to become more diverse, and yet more interconnected.  In a seminal article published in 1962, “The Architecture of Complexity” (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 106, No. 6, December, 1962), Herbert Simon contended that “complexity frequently takes the form of hierarchy”, with systems that can be decomposed into interdependent subsystems.  I think that the 20th-Century psychologist Kurt Lewin best applied a model like this to living entities in his theory of personality.  Personhood, he believed, entailed a two-step process which begins with a separation between self and non-self, a property that he referred to as “differentiation”.  The second step of this process is inclusion of the self into a larger environment or totality, in what he referred to as a “part-whole” relationship.  When looked at from a broader ecological perspective, this two-step process of differentiation and integration is evident at all levels of life and in every phase of evolution.  Single-celled organisms exist because of self-constructed barriers between themselves and their environment, and yet to survive they have to interact with that environment, taking in necessary elements for sustenance, competing with other organisms, and perhaps avoiding predatory organisms as well.  Increased complexity is evident when cells are no longer autonomous entities, but instead are components of larger, multicellular organisms – hierarchies like those described by Herbert Simon.  And from the simplest unicellular organisms to the largest multicellular ones, webs of interconnected relationships continue to emerge and expand: cooperative, competitive, combative, parasitical, and predatory.


Kurt Lewin's Field Theory of Personality
 

I have remarked elsewhere that an interesting characteristic of all living beings with organs of perception, and certainly those that possess some form of consciousness, is that they tend to exclude at least as much as they take in.  This is in part due to simple physical limitations of course: we can only see so far, and can only discern sounds to a certain level of softness.  But other exclusions and limitations seem to have been intentionally “hard-wired” into living beings, such as the limited range of light and sound frequencies that they can perceive.  These limitations make the surrounding environment more “manageable” to the various creatures that live within it, providing them with just enough information to sustain themselves, to avoid predation, and to propagate, without being overwhelmed by sensory input.  Even the function of memory exhibits this tendency to selectivity, so that the present awareness is not cripplingly clouded by a torrent of images, sounds, and feelings from past experiences.

 

And yet, even among the simplest unicellular organisms, and certainly among the higher ones, there is a countervailing impulse to expand this limited cone of awareness, beginning with the act of movement – self-directed, or brought about through some other means.  The expansion becomes more effective through communication, beginning with the simple recognition that there are other living entities identical to or at least similar to oneself.  The successful actions of these others may at first only be observed and mimicked, but at some phase of evolution, information is actively shared, resulting in coordination of activities to serve a common end, and access to a wider pool of knowledge that one can use to specifically serve one’s own purposes.  The means of sharing information become more sophisticated among higher species, culminating in the verbal exchanges of human beings and, beyond this, their writing.  As a result of scientific advancement, we human beings have also found other ways to expand our cones of awareness, through microscopes, telescopes, and even reading glasses and hearing aids.  Among the most social organisms, Simon’s hierarchies are very much in evidence, whether they are simple dominance hierarchies, or highly coordinated activities, as seen among ants and bees, for example.  Hierarchies are the hallmark of human civilization, manifesting in our political organizations, our large private corporations, and even in the way that we structure our general knowledge and information.  Hierarchy, in fact, is a hallmark of life, present across the entire spectrum of species.  Cells that make up larger organisms do not have the free-ranging existence of one-celled creatures, but in return for this loss of freedom they are sustained and protected by the organism of which they are a part.  At the other end of the spectrum we human beings voluntarily and regularly give up parts of our autonomy to our political institutions, our workplaces, and our religious organizations because we believe that by doing so this enriches our individual existences.  We may not be cells rigidly connected to a larger body, but we are all parts, in various ways and to various degrees, of larger wholes. 

 

Is this, then, the culmination of the evolutionary process: perfecting the art of sharing, collecting, and coordinating information so that we can maximize, in a pragmatic sort of way, our individual and collective cones of awareness?  If so, then it is very easy to imagine that intelligent machines could represent the ultimate culmination of this process: organizing, coordinating, and disseminating information in the most efficient way possible, and perhaps even guiding and managing our activities in a way that we believe best serves our ends.  Constitutions and legal codes might even be replaced by systems of social regulation guided by computer programs.  Intelligent machines may logically end up, then, at the apex of the various organizing hierarchies that will bring this model to its greatest fruition.  In the most utopian and benign form of this vision (and science fiction has provided us with an abundance of scenarios where it could go terribly wrong), it is – at least in some ways – an exhilarating one.  And yet even if this best case represents our future and the culmination of civilization – of evolution itself – there is something about it that seems ultimately hollow, empty.

 

A Wildflower Meadow: Paradise or Ecological Battleground?


Is it our emotions, then, that breathe life into evolution?  This is certainly the fundamental thing that sets us – and all animal life – apart from machines, and probably always will.  Have emotions reached a peak of refinement and intensity in human beings, after evolving from the simple anger/fear fight-or-flight emotions of the lower animals?  Even in Darwin’s day, there was a realization that there is a strange paradox underlying evolution, in that behind the image of a beautiful garden meadow, for example, there is a life-and-death struggle involving competition, conflict, and predation among its denizens.  Fear, anger, and selfish desire are just as much fundamental elements of the life process as love and compassion.  Have these latter, more benign, emotions become more prominent with the progression of higher life forms?  They are not unique to human beings of course.  Some species of animals, in addition to being capable of harboring feelings of compassion and affection beyond those required for parental care, even seem to possess their own forms of a sense of humor, and many species have even shown an appreciation for music.  But if the bloody history of human civilization is a representative guide of the life process at its most elevated level, then we must admit that the dark and sordid emotional elements must and do continue to exist right alongside the lighter, more benevolent ones.  If it is not then in emotional refinement where we can hope to find the “soul” of evolution, like that which stirred Emerson’s appreciation of that mystical element of beauty in natural things, and which he said must always defy logical description (even that made possible by artificial intelligence), then where else can we turn?

 

Perhaps the soul of evolution lies in the act of creation, of shaping and organizing the environment as the result of an intentional act of will: marking territory, building nests, making tools, cultivating agriculture, constructing buildings, making music, making art, inventing machines.  Creation is at the very core of consciousness, shaping both our external and internal environments.  Even that limited, filtered stream of perceptions that organisms allow into their consciousness comprise a cacophony of impressions that must be actively ordered into an internal recreation of at least a facsimile of the surrounding environment, and, as the philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested, what we create internally might not entirely correspond with what’s actually out there, around us.  We might already be introducing a little fiction – not just into our present awareness, but also into the growing flood of memories that we are similarly screening and ordering, so that they link our pasts and presents in ways that form coherent life histories. 

 

The philosopher Henri Bergson saw evolution as a progressive, creative act, and his book, Creative Evolution, inspired the title of this present article.  But in that book, he warned that creation – true creation – is incompatible with some of our common conceptions of how the universe works.  For example, if we truly live in a universe where cause-and-effect rules, then in it, “creation” becomes a meaningless concept.  If every invention, every writing, every work of art has come about as the result of an inevitable chain of causes, then no matter how novel or innovative these various productions may appear, they were not the result of creative acts.  In theory, at least, they could have all been foreseen by tracing out, from any time before they appeared, the chain of events that would inevitably lead to them.  This would not be evolutionary complexity brought out by living, genuine creativity, but instead the complexity of a very elaborate wind-up toy.

 

Henri Bergson


Similarly, Bergson argued that if there is some specific “end state” that represents the culmination of evolution, be it a particular form of intelligence, or type of organization, or capacities for perception, communication, or action, then this, too, undercuts the idea of evolution as a creative process.  He likens that end state to a jigsaw puzzle:  As species – and then civilizations – advance, they move farther along in completing that ultimate puzzle, and reaching the perfect end state.  Some may collapse before succeeding, and some may only succeed in piecing together parts of the puzzle.  At least in principle, however, some species, some civilization, may someday reach that ultimate solution: the one that corresponds to the pinnacle of evolution.  But in spite of the diversity of the various approaches, and relative degrees of success, in reaching this end state, perhaps played out by multiple species and multiple civilizations on many worlds over millions of years, the blunt fact is that the single end state always existed, at least as a potential for realization.  And if there is a unique and specific end to evolution, then ultimately the evolutionary process, while perhaps characterized by a multitude of radically different paths, is not a creative one.  Like the inventions inevitably “created” as the result of causal chains, and so not really “inventions” at all, the jigsaw puzzle that defined the culmination of evolution was always there, waiting to be completed, even if it could never be completely seen or comprehended by those who were on the path to completing it.  A genuine work of creation, then, is a novelty: unpredictable right up to the point where it finally comes into existence, and therefore creative evolution is a process that defies causality, and has no pre-determined end.  In Bergson’s own words: “Life in its entirety, regarded as a creative evolution . . . transcends finality, if we understand by finality the realization of an idea conceived or conceivable in advance.”

 

What exactly are we doing when we engage in a genuinely creative act?  At the very least, we are effecting an intentional break in the causal chain of our existence.  The idea that the universe is not limited to unbroken chains of causality has actually become popular among scientists, particularly quantum physicists, who assert that there is a randomness to the most fundamental processes of our universe that cannot be removed by better methods of observation and detection.  Unfortunately, this idea has been pounced upon as a justification for belief in free will.  “Loose play” (a phrase originally coined by the 19th-Century philosopher William James) in sequences of thoughts and events, it is contended, might provide just that space needed for true freedom of action, unconstrained by prior conditions and conditioning.  This is an empty argument for free will, however.  Imagine a driver (or, for that matter, a driverless car, following a computer program) that has been directed to follow a particular route.  But while the initial set of left- or right-turns have been explicitly specified in the instructions, at some point, the driver is instructed to make a turn based upon some method of random selection, like a coin toss (e.g., left-turn for “heads”, right-turn for “tails”).  Has this introduced an element of “free will” into the trip?  Hardly, since in spite of the randomness introduced into the outcome – the final destination – the driver is still following directions, and is not exercising any form of personal choice into the navigational decisions.  If we are to believe in free will, we won’t be able to find justification for it in the randomness postulated by modern physics.  If God is “playing dice” (as Einstein put it) with the universe, then God may be playing dice with our minds as well, but this won’t make us self-directed, autonomous agents: we would simply be living beings that are ultimately unpredictable, even to ourselves.

 

"Blue Poles" (aka "Number 11, 1952") by Jackson Pollack

Assuming, then, that we are truly free, how do we create, and how do these acts of creation lead to evolution, in the open-ended way that Bergson envisioned it?  At its most basic, we create by imposing an order in our universe that didn’t exist before: an order that is within our level of comprehension, but is somehow different than the order that has been given to us, in our surroundings.  I do this if I paint, for example, a bowl of fruit.  It may be a perfect likeness of an actual bowl of fruit in front of me, or I might innovate by changing particular elements of the picture, like the shades of color, or the number of pieces of each type of fruit within the bowl.  Beyond this, I may produce a scene or images that draw from multiple experiences of mine, including various elements of each, thereby making it completely unique, and original.  The art of painting has evolved over time, with advanced techniques of representing perspective allowing painters to more accurately reproduce scenes of depth.  But with the growth of technology, and particularly the advent of the camera, artists were spurred to go beyond producing, through painting, reproductions of actual scenes, or even original but realistic portrayals of fictional scenes, and do something more: something that would require the viewer to be more creative in his or her interpretation of the work.  We find an extreme example of this in the work of Jackson Pollock, who randomly splattered colors of paint onto a canvas.  In the chaotic array of colors that resulted, the viewer is invited – or challenged – to find in that chaos an underlying order that is pleasing to the eye.  This introduction of intentional randomness, chaos, or cacophony, is actually the hallmark of all great works of art.  Great musical compositions move beyond the simple repetition of pleasant-sounding melodies and introduce novel sequences of notes that at first seem to disrupt or even destroy the comfortable pattern, but then resolve into a greater, more complex melody that is ultimately more pleasing to the ear.  In his book, The Rigor of Angels, William Egginton describes how in the creative process of writing a mystery novel, this combination of order and chaos, familiarity and unpredictability, in a suitably balanced way, is absolutely essential: 

 

You make it through three-hundred-plus pages, and the culprit turns out to be a character you’ve never met before with no connection to the story so far. Surprising? Certainly, but no one in their right mind would judge this to be an excellent way to end the story. Now let’s say that in the mystery you’re reading, each clue led so inevitably to the final revelation that you could see it coming a hundred pages before the end. Clearly that would be unsatisfying as well. In the first case you would be faced with a random occurrence, an unmotivated insertion into the structure of the novel that destroyed any sense of its coherence, its purposiveness. The novel is certainly surprising, but there is nothing inevitable about it—the occurrences seem random, without purpose. In the second case, however, you’ve seen the author’s handiwork the whole way through; it’s all inevitability with no surprise, all artifice with no naturalness.

 

And it is not just in the arts, but in scientific invention and discovery where a process like this plays out, where random discoveries or unanticipated outcomes of controlled experiments are combined with existing systems of knowledge (sometimes over the resistance of those who are intellectually wedded to the existing systems) to produce something new, or better.  A popular apocryphal story about Thomas Edison’s invention of the incandescent light bulb is that he tried running an electric current through an immense number of alternative metal filaments – each which burned out rather quickly, if working at all to produce light – until he finally tried tungsten as a filament material.  Whether it is the artist playing with different combinations of colors or sequences of words or musical notes and then integrating them into a structured work, or the scientist experimenting with different materials and techniques, the process is the same: it is an intentional foray into randomness in order to find a new, satisfactory product of order.

 

But in defining creativity as an act of imposing a new order in our environment, we have to be careful and not imply that by doing so we are always creating order where none existed, or creating a greater order than existed before.  When a new building is raised, regardless of the sophistication of its design, or the novelty of its architecture, it may not be imposing a new or greater order in the area that it is occupying.  If the land where it is constructed had first to be cleared, then an entire ecosystem, with complex interconnecting webs of diverse animal and plant species had to be swept away . . . destroyed.  As so eloquently expressed by songstress Joni Mitchell in her classic song Big Yellow Taxi, “They paved paradise, put up a parking lot”.  “Yellow Taxiing” creation – the tearing down of one form of order to create another – reminds me of that old joke about a dim-witted man who fell off of a cruise ship and found himself washed up on a deserted island.  After a thorough search, all that he could find was a small, fully intact sailboat floating in the harbor.  And after giving the matter some thought, the man realized that this was his way of escaping the island: all he had to do was break down the sailboat and use the wood to build a raft.  But “Yellow Taxiing” is actually a fundamental element of creation, which is not just a nasty byproduct of civilization.  It is ubiquitous in nature: even the simple process of food digestion is a breaking down of one form of order in order to preserve or enhance another. 

 

Picasso Untitled Sculpture (Chicago)

Of course, to the architect and the architect’s contractors, what was standing in the way of their building (and its parking lot) was a chaotic mess of weeds, wildflowers, and pests, and here we stumble upon another insight: that what is order to one entity may be chaos to another, with chaos often representing a higher order that is beyond the comprehension of many entities.  The spider that builds a web in a corner of my living room has no appreciation for the furniture in that room: the individual expertly-crafted designs and the way that the furniture is carefully placed and positioned.  I, on the other hand, upon encountering its web, might see it as an ugly, gooey, incoherent mess, completely unable to appreciate how the individual strands of webbing were carefully constructed and conformed to an intentional plan.  Pigeons have little or no appreciation for the public statues that they perch on: who or what these statues represent, and why they were erected.  On the other hand, both pigeons and humans alike might have difficulty making sense of the Picasso sculpture that occupies Chicago’s Daley Plaza.  I personally believe that the Chicago architectural skyline looks magnificent when viewed from Lake Michigan, but I have no idea what ecological diversity was destroyed to make it possible.  Creativity, then, often involves creative destruction, and, rather than the creation or advancement of order, often results in the replacement of one form of order with another (perhaps even less complex) alternative order, imposed by its creator.

 




These creative processes – “Pollacking” and “Yellow Taxiing” – while explaining how intentional novelty comes about, still fall short of explaining how novelty leads to increasing complexity.  After all, if every living creature has a limit in how much order it is capable of seeing and comprehending, then it seems that no amount of effort is going to enable it to produce something of a greater order, but simply new and different things that fall within its limits of comprehending order.  And the Darwinian drive to effective adaptation would seem to lead only to a living world of perfectly-fitting parts, rather than an evolving one, as popularly understood.

 

It seems that it is the process of interaction, among living entities, that is responsible for this – for creating a whole greater than its parts.  This is particularly evident in human civilization, where no individual is capable of understanding all of the science and technology which supports and sustains that civilization.  I remember watching a documentary about the great 19th-Century German mathematical genius Carl Friedrich Gauss.  The narrator said that he was the last human being who was capable of understanding everything that was known at the time about mathematics.  After Gauss, the field had become too broad, diversified, and complex for any single person – no matter how gifted – to take it all in.  I actually had experience of this firsthand when I encountered a dirty little secret in the university system.  It happened when I was in the graduate program in economics.  To earn a degree, a student in that program has to take two comprehensive exams – one in macroeconomics, and one in microeconomics – and, as the name implies, the exams were intended for the student to demonstrate that he or she had a sufficiently broad understanding spanning the complete breadth and depth of these fields.  To my shock and horror, I flunked the macroeconomics exam the first time I attempted it: shocked because I had gotten all A’s in the macroeconomics courses I had taken.  When I went into the economics department office, completely distraught, the secretary offered her sincere sympathy, but also asked me if I had studied the practice exams.  And then it hit me.  “Of course,” I thought to myself, while probably slapping the palm of my hand onto my forehead, “the practice exams!”  I had forgotten my experiences as a graduate student in the mathematics program at another university.  That program, too, required the passing of comprehensive exams as prerequisites for getting a degree, but everyone knew that to succeed at these, one had to look at the practice exams.  The field of mathematics was simply too broad (as the Gauss documentarian had said) for even the most gifted student to have a comprehensive knowledge of it.  The practice exams provided clues to the student on exactly what kinds of questions would be asked: sometimes the only difference between these and the actual exams were minor changes in wording or numbers.  With this resource, I had passed those two mathematics comprehensive exams and now, after reviewing the practice exams available in the economics department office, I went on to the pass the macroeconomics exam on my second attempt (fortunately we were allowed a second attempt), and the microeconomics exam on the first one.

Carl Friedrich Gauss
 

It is probably not too broad a generalization to say that all of the sciences have grown so much in scope and complexity that no single individual could have complete comprehension and mastery of any one of them, or even of any of their subdisciplines.  And yet they continue to grow, as the underlying base of knowledge that supports them expands through the contributions and interactions of their practitioners.  Even our economy works that way, as so eloquently described by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.  In his famous pin factory example, he describes how several individuals, each acquainted with only a simple distinct task associated with making pins, can, when their work is coordinated, produce many thousands of pins a day.  And through the “invisible hand” of the free market, individuals acting in their own limited self-interest can promote broader economic ends that had not been part of their intention, and probably beyond their comprehension.

 

In civilization, then, our sciences, technologies, markets, and social institutions are larger in scope than any individual can completely comprehend or manage, but it is through our collective activity that they are not just sustained, but continue to grow in complexity.  And if we look at the life process in general, from the simplest single-celled organisms to the multicellular vertebrates, we can see that it is a collection of individual living entities, each a separate “I-ness”, with a boundary separating “self” from “non-self”, and a limited, often selective ability to perceive its environment, which paradoxically exhibits an innate drive to expand its particular cone of awareness, and of activity, in order to survive, if nothing else.  And this leads to interaction with other “I-nesses”, which in turn leads to those expanding webs of interconnection that produce the growing complexity of the ecosystem.  But this is a living process, not a mechanistic one, beginning with that mysterious “I-Thou” relationship (as Martin Buber would call it) in which a living entity senses that another entity it encounters is somehow, in some way, like itself.

Female Praying Mantis Eating Its Mate
 

I know that biologists have a counterargument to this view of individual entities acting in their self-interest, and by doing so, in a manner similar to Adam Smith’s economic “invisible hand”, creating and sustaining complex systems greater than what they could ever individually manage or even comprehend.  This is the “selfish gene” theory: a more mechanistic view of evolution in which genes, rather than individual self-interest, are the real drivers of adaptation.  And there are many examples to support their view, in which individual members of certain species engage in acts of self-sacrifice that, while self-destructive, actually further the chances for their particular species’ survival.  Many examples of this stem from the sexual impulse which, like emotions, are a characteristic of living beings that will never be duplicated by machines.  (I have no doubt that someday robotic sex toys will be able to convincingly simulate a human being in the throes of sexual passion, but I firmly believe that no artificially intelligent machine will ever be able to genuinely feel sexual desire or passion.)  The most extreme cases involve those unfortunate male insects and arachnids for which surrendering to the sexual impulse is their final living act.  Even in human beings, a surrender to the sexual impulse is often a self-destructive act, resulting in the destruction of public reputations, careers, marriages, and – in cases involving the abuse of power – the loss of freedom.  But from the perspective of the selfish gene theory, this occasional self-destructive tendency of sexual desire – at least in those cases involving insects and spiders – actually serves to further the survival advantages of the species, particularly when the dying male becomes the next meal for the mother of his future children.

 

But there are counterexamples, where an individual of one species sacrifices its life to save an individual of another.  I’m thinking of those cases where a dog has died fighting off some wild beast, like a bear, to protect its master.  Now even here a biologist might argue that the “selfish gene” behavior is actually at play, because the noble behavior of such dogs will encourage humans to perpetuate their lineage.  But this can’t explain the reverse situation.  Humans will go to great lengths to protect their animals, even at risk to their own lives.  I can think of one particular tragic case, involving a young man who was visiting a hot springs national park.  His dog dived into one of these hot springs, and in spite of the shouts of others standing nearby to let the dog be, the young man dived in as well, to try to save it.  Both of them died.  Less dramatic but significantly more common examples of human benevolence to other species include the placement of bird feeders and bird baths by homeowners in their yards, and taxpayer-supported wild animal sanctuaries and national parks.  But even beyond this, we have seen, over the past century or so, increasing numbers of human beings taking up the cause of environmentalism, and expressing an active concern for the welfare of other species.  This actually seems to be a byproduct of the growing cones of awareness and action made accessible to each of us by civilization: a growing cone of empathy as well.  To be sure, many if not most human beings still direct most of their empathy to relatives, or close friends and, to a lesser extent, those who share their religious views, or political views, or ethnic, racial, and national identity.  Sadly, one only has to check the daily news to see rampant and often tragic examples of political, ethnic, and religious tribalism.  And yet, that growing cone of empathy is there as well, and it continues to grow.  It provides a hopeful sign that maybe evolution – including the evolution of human civilization, with its computers and other machinery – actually does make us better, somehow, or at least increases the potential for each of us to be better versions of ourselves.  Artificial intelligence, if properly harnessed, will only enhance that potential, perhaps significantly.  In this light, I can understand the ebullient (but still cautious) optimism of futurists like Ray Kurzweil, who believes that technology, including that of AI, is accelerating our evolution.  The point, however, is that at the heart of evolution there will always be a real, living heart . . . and mind (“. . . and,” some might add, “spirit”).  AI will augment our potential to engage in creative projects of a higher order.  Yes, it will also present a potent lure to indolence, as well.  I suspect that in our future, many if not most of us will spend at least part of our days – and some will spend all of their days – behaving like those overstuffed couch potatoes in Wall-E, and perhaps there is a real risk that an excess of “Yellow-Taxiing” creation will leave our world as ecologically desolate as that in the movie.  But for at least some of us, hopefully many of us, and ideally most or all of us, we will have and use a greatly enhanced ability to put our individual creative powers to currently unimaginable greater ends.

 


And the ultimate arbiters of how valuable those creations are will be living, human beings, who are capable of feeling the awe expressed by Henry David Thoreau while gazing up at the clouds.  Computers will be able to write essays on these creations, and even imitate works of art “in the style of” certain artists, or in conformity with the tastes of a particular audience.  The greatest works of art, however, are those that create new styles and move beyond conforming to existing tastes.  Sometimes they actually compel the tastes of their audience to “evolve” in order for them to truly appreciate the genius of an artistic innovator.  That’s real evolution – creative evolution – and it is the evolution that is at the heart of life.

 

I couldn’t resist ending this long essay by simply putting the fundamental question which I was attempting to address to ChatGPT: “What is the ultimate purpose of evolution?”  Here is the reply:

 

The "ultimate purpose" of evolution is not a question that has a straightforward scientific answer. Evolution, as understood through biological science, is a natural and ongoing process without inherent purpose. However, the question of purpose can be explored through various philosophical, religious, and personal lenses:

·        In science: Evolution is a process without inherent purpose or end goal.

·        In philosophy: Purpose is a human concept; evolution itself lacks an intrinsic meaning.

·        In religion: Some views see evolution as part of a divine plan.

·        In practical terms: Evolution helps us understand life and informs ethical frameworks.

Ultimately, the purpose of evolution can be seen differently depending on one’s perspective and the questions one is seeking to answer.

 

It’s a good, comprehensive and noncommittal answer, and ultimately a comforting one, in that I know that at least at the present time, AI has not developed any concrete plans for my future, or for that of the rest of the planet.

  

Thursday, February 29, 2024

He and She and She

 

 

A recent survey published by the Public Religion Research Institute included the shocking conclusion that 28% of Americans aged 18 to 25, colloquially known as “Generation Z”, identify themselves as LGBTQ.  It is a dramatic rise from earlier generations, including my own, the “Baby Boomers” – persons born during the years from 1946 to 1964 – in which only 4% identified themselves as LGBTQ.  News of the survey’s results prompted comedian and talk show host Bill Maher to joke that this dramatic upward trend in percentages implies that, in the not-too-distant future, “We’ll all be LGBTQ”.  As I reviewed the press releases which summarized this survey, and even visited the website of the organization, my greatest regret was that the results were not broken down by gender, because I had noticed many years ago an interesting trend which seemed to be limited to the female sex.

 

My first discovery of this trend was when I came across a survey published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2005, titled “Sexual Behavior and Selected Health Measures: Men and Women 15–44 Years of Age, United States, 2002”.  One of the questions posed to respondents was to identify the nature of their sexual attraction.  For men, the alternative responses were “Only female”, “Mostly female”, “Both”, “Mostly male”, “Only Male”, and “Not Sure”, and similarly for women, the alternative responses were “Only male”, Mostly male”, “Both”, “Mostly female”, “Only female”, and “Not Sure”.  The responses were divided into five age groups: 18-19 years, 20-24 years, 25-29 years, 30-34 years, and 35-44 years.  Among the male respondents, the answers showed no clear trend among these age groups, with the “Only female” category getting the largest percentage, averaging 92.2% among them, and the “Mostly female” category getting the second largest percentage, averaging 3.8%.  Together, the “Mostly male” and “Only male” categories averaged 2.2%, and the “Both” category (apparently representing complete bisexuals) averaged only 1.0%.  (The “Not sure” category averaged 0.8%).  But among the female respondents, a marked trend did appear among the different age groups.  Their complete results were as follows:

 

Age

Only Males

Mostly Males

Both

Mostly Females

Only Females

Not Sure

18-19

80.1%

12.8%

4.9%

-

-

0.8%

20-24

82.5%

13.3%

2.3%

0.3%

0.5%

1.0%

25-29

82.1%

13.5%

2.4%

0.7%

0.6%

0.8%

30-34

86.6%

9.8%

1.9%

0.5%

0.4%

0.7%

35-44

89.2%

7.1%

1.1%

1.0%

1.0%

0.6%

 

What immediately becomes apparent is that there had been a marked change in the proportion of females who considered themselves exclusively heterosexual, falling by over 9% from the oldest age group (which included Baby Boomers and some from Generation X) to the youngest, accompanied by nearly a 6% increase in those who considered themselves mostly attracted to males, and a relatively sharp rise in the “Both” (bisexual) category, from 1% to 5%.  The overall impression left by this data is that women, unlike their male counterparts, have become more “fluid” in their sexual preferences over the past few decades.

 

Now of course, as political polls have starkly demonstrated in recent years, survey results such as these must be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.  With sex surveys in particular, respondents might be reluctant to be completely honest in their answers.  And even if these trends are reflective of reality, they open themselves up to alternative explanations.  For example, the fact that the percentages of women identifying themselves as mainly or entirely attracted to other women, which are lower among the younger respondents, rather than indicating a downward trend over time, might simply imply that many women don’t realize they are lesbians until later in life.  Similarly, the higher percentages of younger women who identify themselves as not entirely heterosexual might reflect the “college lesbian” phenomenon, in which women of those ages tend to engage in more sexual experimentation.  And so while I was surprised by these differences between the male and female respondents, with the female respondents seeming to show a gradual but significant change in their sexual preferences over time, I did try to refrain from jumping to conclusions.

 

But then, about a decade later, I encountered an almost identical survey, also performed under the auspices of the CDC, published in 2016, titled “Sexual Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Orientation Among Adults Aged 18–44 in the United States: Data From the 2011–2013 National Survey of Family Growth”.  While the response categories were the same, the age group classifications were condensed from 5 to 3:

 

Age

Only Males

Mostly Males

Both

Mostly Females

Only Females

Not Sure

18-24

75.9%

14.4%

5.3%

1.7%

1.0%

1.8%

25-34

79.1%

15.4%

3.3%

0.3%

0.9%

0.9%

35-44

86.6%

9.2%

1.7%

0.7%

0.6%

1.3%

 

These results seem to confirm that a trend has been occurring, and is continuing, with now just 76% of the youngest cohort (college-age women) reporting that they are only attracted to men.  And only 79% of the next highest age bracket, which roughly represents the same group surveyed in the college-age bracket a decade earlier, reported that they are only attracted to men.  This is lower than what the college-age bracket reported in that earlier survey, which seems to undermine the “college lesbian” (i.e., transitory sexual experimentation) theory.  However, the 35-44 age bracket in the later survey includes a higher percentage of women in the “Only Males” category than their counterparts in the 25-34 age bracket of the earlier survey, so perhaps this indicates that the “experimentation” phase lasts beyond the college years, through the early thirties, before reverting to more conventional sexual behavior patterns.

 

Again, this is probably lending more interpretation to the survey results than they actually merit, but it is hard to challenge the overall impression that a clear trend in American female sexuality is in evidence.  I’ve not seen any more CDC surveys since the one that came out in 2016, but I did happen upon a more recent study published in 2021 titled “Sexuality in Emerging Adulthood”, which was authored by Elizabeth M. Morgan and Manfred H. M. van Dulmen.  This one included an annual survey of college-aged persons from the years 2011 through 2019, and used categories almost identical to those of the CDC studies.  As with the earlier CDC study, the annual survey showed little change in the sexual preferences of the male respondents over time, although the percentage of men who identified as exclusively heterosexual was lower than the CDC study, at only 85%.  (The percentage of men who indicated that they were mostly or exclusively attracted to other men was also about twice as high as that reported in the CDC study.)  But in this study, again, there were clear trends among the female respondents in nearly all categories, with the percentage of women saying that they were only sexually attracted to men falling from around 77% in the beginning of the study period to about 65% in the final year (2019).  (The same study indicated that while there was no trend among males reporting that they had engaged in sex with other men, with an average of about 10% saying that they had done so, there again was a clear trend among women, with the percentage reporting that they had engaged in sex with other women doubling from 9% in 2011 to 18% in 2019.)

 

 

And this brings us back to the most recent poll, with its surprising result that 28% of Gen Z Americans identify themselves as LGBTQ.  Again, this result should be treated with at least a little skepticism:  A Gallup poll done in 2020, which posed the same question, found that only 16% of Gen Z Americans identified themselves as LGBTQ, which is more consistent with the earlier studies.  But on the other hand, a poll conducted by Ipsos, a global market research and public opinion firm, in early 2021, found that 14% of Gen Z Americans said that they were attracted mainly or entirely to the same sex, and 21% said that they were equally attracted to both sexes.  The poll also found that just 51% of females in that generation now said that they were sexually attracted to men only.  This result, if true, would reveal a very dramatic shift in female sexual preference over the past few decades, with over 8 out of 9 females in the Baby Boomer generation identifying as exclusively attracted to men, and only 1 out of 2 females doing so in Gen Z.  It echoes a general conclusion that emerged from all of these most recent studies and surveys: that the growth of bisexuality among females is a principal if not predominant cause of the growing percentage of LGBTQ adults in America.

 

But what could cause such a dramatic shift in female sexual preferences (and behavior)?  Certainly there are a number of contributing factors, including the sexual revolution, with its advocacy of a wider variety of sexual practices, and a more general social acceptance of sexual identities and preferences that are not confined to heterosexuality.  But these alone could not account for the significant disparity between genders in these changing sexual preferences.  I believe that there is one, fundamental, thing that is driving this shift among females.  It is pornography.

 

Many years ago I read an article about a psychological study that had identified different ways that males and females react to erotic images or movies.  (And here I can enjoy the greater latitude given to me in writing on this subject in a blog, rather than an academic journal, where I would have to locate said study and cite it.)  The author(s) of the study found that a woman, when viewing a male and female engaged in a sexual act, could mentally place herself into the image and role of the female, and thereby experience the act vicariously in her imagination, with the female performer essentially becoming her avatar.  For men, on the other hand, this was a more difficult thing to do, because the men, when viewing a man and woman engaged in sex, tended to view the male figure as a rival.  His presence in the image was intrusive, and an unpleasant distraction.  Now I can’t remember if the study went on to make the following conclusion that I am about to state, but I think that it is a pretty obvious one.  At some time in the past, purveyors of pornography came upon a simple solution to this problem.  Rather than showing a man and a woman having sex, they could replace the man with another woman.  The (heterosexual) male viewer could then enjoy the image of a woman (or rather two women) in various stages of undress and in the heat of sexual passion, without having to contend with the unpleasant distraction of looking at another man.  It proved to be an eminently successful solution, but in order to make it work, pornographers had to popularize two conventions: the “lipstick lesbian” (i.e., a beautiful actress/model portraying a lesbian whose beauty conforms to conventional standards appealing to the male gaze: clean-shaven bodies, high heels, make-up, etc.) and the pansexual female.  Several decades ago, when the availability of pornography was confined to seedy adult bookstores, which most women avoided, women in general were probably completely oblivious to these conventions, unless they happened to glimpse examples of them in adult magazines like Penthouse.

 

But this all changed when pornography gradually became more accessible to a general audience – both male and female – and moved beyond the boundaries of “girlie magazines” and the “stag films” that were often shown at bachelor parties.  Cable television provided the avenue of entry to this more general realm.  I remember this well, because I was in college at the time, and whenever I would visit my parents during break, I would enjoy the cable television premium subscription package that they had, which included a wide assortment of offerings, including some clearly intended for an adult audience.  During my visit, after they went to bed, I would stay up and peruse some of these adult offerings, like the “Adam and Eve” and “Playboy” channels.  These featured softcore pornography, which avoided showing explicit images of male or female genitalia, but otherwise left little or nothing to the imagination in portraying the various sexual activities of the performers.  They included heterosexual couplings of course, along with indulgences in relatively benign fetishes, but the lipstick lesbian and pansexual female were popular presences here as well, with prolific scenes of very attractive females kissing and romancing other attractive females, and coupling with them in ways that, again, left little or nothing to the imagination.  These, then, constituted the type of sexual behavior that was considered suitable for pornography tailored to a broader, cable television audience.  What was never shown on these adult channels – at least back then – were bisexual or homosexual males, as their behavior was apparently considered unsuitable for that same audience. 

 

Eventually, the offerings of these softcore pornography channels were superseded in popularity by adult-oriented, “after dark” programs made available by mainstream channels, such as HBO and Cinemax.  These were generally featured in the very late evening or very early morning hours, and often only on weekends.  They were still softcore pornography, but the features were scrubbed, polished, and standardized into something that apparently was considered more appropriate for a popular cable television channel.  The female performers were almost always in their twenties, usually Caucasian, sometimes Asian, and rarely black, while the male performers tended to be a decade or so older than their female counterparts, usually Caucasian, sometimes black, and rarely Asian.  The movies followed a very predictable format.  They were generally light-hearted in tone, with a comedic or mildly melodramatic plot interspersed with scenes involving sexual coupling.  The standard number of these sex scenes tended to be four, and followed an almost identical format: with the first being male-female, the second female-female, the third male-female, and the final sex scene constituting a sort of grand finale involving more than two people (e.g., a male-female-female menage a trois, or two or more couples engaged in an orgy).  And it was not uncommon for each of the two females involved in the lesbian scene to be a participant in one or the other of the heterosexual love scenes, further popularizing the fictional convention of the pansexual female.  (I must confess again that I made these observations not as a result of a dispassionate academic research investigation.  However, having said that, I will add that these films were ultimately disappointing to watch: because they were so routinized in the manner that they set up and choreographed each scene, they actually made sex appear boring!)

 

This, then, was the fictional erotic universe created to satiate the heterosexual male’s lust: one in in which men seduced women, and women seduced both men and each other.  Cable television had liberated this universe from the obscure, backwater realm of the adult bookstores and sex shops, and brought it to a more general audience.  From there, it seeped even further into the general consciousness, as the lipstick lesbian and sexually fluid female made a growing appearance in popular television programs and movies.  But there has been one other, seismic shift in the landscape of pornographic fantasies, and that has been the rise of internet pornography.

 

In 2007, two websites were created that featured pornographic videos: XVideos and Pornhub, and they have since become immensely popular, with XVideos now the 9th, and Pornhub the 14th, most visited websites in the world.  (Internet pornography had already existed at least a decade before these companies came into being, but they have been largely responsible for its general surge in popularity.)  The innovation that is at the base of these websites, and the many others like them that exist, is that they present an “a la carte” approach to viewing pornography:  Search engines enable viewers to find and select videos that cater to their particular tastes and fancies, including the age, race, ethnicity, and gender of the performers.  And while most of the popular pornographic website providers, such as XVideos and Pornhub, endeavor to portray themselves as benign purveyors of this material, with requirements, for example, that all featured performers be at least 18 years of age, that they are voluntary participants, and that video submissions featuring their performances have been made with their consent, the websites have not escaped controversy, with accusations levied against them of some videos involving human trafficking and the involuntary participation of persons featured in them.  But even if these accusations are unfounded, there are two additional unsavory facts about these providers.  First, unlike the offerings of adult entertainment on cable television, the internet videos are explicit, showing full nudity, including genitalia, and so are of the “hardcore” rather than “softcore” variety shown on cable television.  And second, these offerings are available, and at no cost on many of these websites, to anyone who has internet access, with the only gatekeeping generally being a requirement that anyone entering the website confirm that they are at least eighteen years of age, without having to verify this in any formal sort of way.  It is highly likely, then, that many children are now getting their first exposure to sex through viewing videos on these websites.

 

But has this been a principal cause of the growth of bisexuality among young females?  If, as the recent surveys suggest, this trend has been accelerating over the past decade or so, then the timing seems to be right, as it coincides with the massive growth in popularity of internet pornographic websites.  But on the other hand, because these websites are driven by search engines, users are actually choosing what types of videos they view.  Pornhub publishes on the internet an annual demographic summary describing who its users are and their viewing behaviors.  Globally, it reports that the percentage of female viewership has grown from 24% in 2015 to 36% in 2023.  In America, the percentage of female viewers is a little lower, hovering around 30% over the past few years.  The share of viewers in the youngest age category, 18-24, was at 23% in the U.S. in 2023 (27% worldwide), and it can be presumed that this includes children who are only claiming to be 18 or over.  The Pornhub report also includes a ranking of the most popular search words worldwide, by gender of viewers, and while the entire lists have changed over time, with various words rising and falling in popularity, the top picks have been very consistent over the years.  Among female viewers, the most popular search word is “lesbian”.  (Among male viewers, it is “Japanese”.)  So there is a definite curiosity among female viewers about lesbianism, perhaps stoked by other causes, but easily addressed and satisfied by pornographic websites such as Pornhub.  (At least some of these female viewers may actually be lesbians, of course, but given the very low percentage of females who identify themselves as such, even in the more recent surveys, it is likely that most of these female viewers are not.) 

 

What to make of all of this?  I must admit, again, that I am no puritan, and my attitude toward sexual behavior in general is probably consistent with much if not most of the general public:  If it brings happiness and pleasure, only involves consenting adults, and is creating no collateral harm, then where is the reproach?  And I must confess, too, that like many if not most male heterosexuals I find scenes and images of female sapphic behavior titillating.  But the pornographic industry, in creating and popularizing a fantasy world in which these behaviors are believably commonplace: one in which (heterosexual) men will be men, but many if not most women have a fluid sexuality that makes it just as easy for them to be seduced by another woman as by a man, seems to have succeeded in creating a phenomenon where life is increasingly imitating “art” (if I may use that word).  And I wonder if we men might someday be finding ourselves confronting the old adage: “Be careful what you wish for.”

 

There are at least some feminists who might actually welcome these trends, because there has always been a branch of radical feminism which believes that the cultivation by females of a sexual attraction for one another is an effective way of neutralizing a major factor contributing to their dependency on males.  But as this behavior has increasingly become a reality, such feminists will find themselves (if I may use the expression) “strange bedfellows” with pornographers, who have played a large if not dominant role in bringing about its emergence.

 

The physicist Neils Bohr once famously said, “Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future,” and predictions often go terribly – even laughably – wrong when they are simply based upon extrapolations of present trends.  And so at the risk of descending into absurdity, I will venture to describe some future scenarios where trends in female sexual behavior may be leading us. 

 

At one extreme, if this trend continues unabated, and bisexual behavior among females becomes common and in fact a societal norm, we might find ourselves living in the female counterpart to that strange episode in human civilization – classical Greece – when it was customary for a middle-aged man to have both a (female) wife and a young male lover.  But such a society may be a very dystopian one for many men, particularly those who are victims of what has been called in recent years the “Boy Crisis”.  This refers to the increasing marginalization of boys and young men in society, who are lagging behind their female counterparts in educational performance, and, among the working classes, finding it increasingly difficult to find the kind of gainful employment that their fathers and grandfathers found in the manufacturing sector.  Many of these young males are descending into antisocial behavior, including drug and alcohol abuse, and crime, and many more are finding themselves underemployed, or working low wage, menial jobs, or not working at all.  It would be challenging enough for such men to attract a mate, but much, much more so if they now find that they are not just competing with other males, but with females as well, for the amorous affections of women.  If the trend toward female pansexuality is a global one, and one that is not just confined to America, then in those countries where “gendercide” – sexually selective abortions favoring male over female infants, for reasons of economic security – has been practiced, young men will face the additional challenge of finding a mate in a much-reduced female population.  One could imagine a society in which it is not uncommon for adult males to be living in their mother’s basement, unmarried and with little or no means of self-support, wiling away their hours in an alcohol- and cannabis-fueled haze, listening to music, gaming, and watching pornography, perhaps enhanced and intensified with the latest advances in virtual reality.  Mothers of these aimless young men will only be able to turn to their husbands (or wives), roll their eyes, and shrug their shoulders in helpless exasperation. 

 

In fact, there is already an emerging class of men, identifying themselves as “Incels” (involuntary celibates), who have abandoned all hope of having a sexual/romantic relationship with a female.  (I should remark at this point that I have never given much currency to the theory that the growth in female bisexuality is due to the death of masculinity, brought on by feminist critiques of conventional male behavior and intensified by concerted protests against sexual harassment, such as the “Me Too” movement.  The idea here is that men in general have been systematically intimidated in order to compel them to avoid engaging in traditionally masculine behavior, with the result that they have become less attractive to women.  When I think back to the days of my youth, long before the phrase “toxic masculinity” entered the popular lexicon, I remember that the men who were most successful on the dating scene – who had what is sometimes called “animal magnetism”: an apparent ability to attract female admirers with little or no effort – were not “alpha males” who dominated their peers.  They weren’t even “macho” men, in the generally understood sense of that word.  Instead, they had an easy-going manner about them – a natural gregariousness.  Any air of self-confidence that they exuded was of a serene sort, which, rather than coming off as arrogant or condescending, only made women feel comfortable and safe around them, never intimidated, and certainly never bullied.  They exhibited a playfully nonchalant attitude about sex: they enjoyed it, and were not hampered by any inhibitions, and yet acted as if they could “take it or leave it”: an attitude completely devoid of desperation or compulsion.  And this attitude, ironically, was like catnip to their female companions, stoking their own passions.  These men, then, while often athletic, were the antithesis of the brutish boors that have populated the “Me Too” horror stories.)

 

Coincidentally, while I was putting this piece together, I came across an article in The Guardian authored by Gaby Hinsliff titled “I was puzzled by younger women’s reaction to Barbie. It turned out Gen Z men held the answer” (February 2, 2024).  She was referring to the different reaction among her generation of women to the Barbie movie (who simply saw “colour and fun”) and that of Gen Z women, who seemed to see in it a much more serious message about the growing divide between men and women.  She writes:

 

Something is happening to Gen Z that belies lazy “woke” stereotypes. As young women become dramatically more liberal, young men are getting more conservative, not only in the US but – according to a Financial Times analysis – from South Korea to Germany, Poland to China. Though the divide is relatively modest in Britain, polling this week found that one in five British men aged 16 to 29 who have heard of him think warmly of Andrew Tate, the YouTube misogynist currently facing charges in Romania of rape and human trafficking (which he denies). So much for all those well-meaning school assemblies on toxic masculinity.

 

After providing examples of the trend toward political extremism among Gen Z males, she concludes:

 

But if the political implications are alarming, there are more intimate consequences, too. Why on earth would the Swiftie generation want to settle down with men who seem to hate them, ranting on dates about how feminism has gone too far and scoffing at ideas they hold dear? The angriest Kens may be heading for the kind of lonely lives that, if anything, might only intensify their embittered search for easy scapegoats.

 

It’s still unclear what exactly is driving all this, with possible causes ranging from social media polarisation to pushback against #MeToo, economic trends such as more women than men going to university (with consequences for lifetime earnings), or the so-called bachelor timebomb in South Korea and China, where young men outnumber women and so struggle to find partners. Such a complex phenomenon won’t have simple answers. But unless young people of both sexes are happy to end up living alone with their cats, it’s probably in all our interests to find them.

 

The scenario that Hinsliff describes is that of an outright growing hostility between the sexes in Generation Z, and while she doesn’t mention trends in sexual behavior, one wonders if these are a contributing cause of the mutual sexual alienation she describes, or a consequence of it, or both – in a sort of descending spiral of antipathy.

 

            So much for the dystopian future.  But while this might be the fate awaiting many young men, others will continue to find avenues for success that provide them with a decent living and a comfortable lifestyle, thereby enabling them to fare much better in finding and maintaining romantic relationships, and for them the future could be very different: potentially even a utopia, of sorts.  Such men, with their bisexual wives’ or girlfriends’ full support and participation, if not outright encouragement, might spice up their love lives by occasionally – or even permanently – bringing an additional woman into the relationship.

 

            There is another – probably more likely – scenario, however, which is that things will be pretty much the same as they are now.  After all, there have been many trends, and innovations, and inventions in the past that, on their first appearance, were seen by many to threaten the survival of the family, or the American way of life, or civilization in general: such as mass immigrations of the “wrong” sort of people, secularism, jazz and – later – rock and roll, pot, the birth control pill and the sexual revolution, ultraconservatism, ultraliberalism, even automobiles and television, not to mention the internet in general and social media in particular.  So far, at least, the general features of the family have survived all of these threats and onslaughts intact.  We are a more permissive society, and a more tolerant one of alternative lifestyles, but I suspect that most of us see this as a generally good thing, which actually makes our world a better one than that of previous generations.  Greater sexual fluidity among the female population may simply be a new and permanent feature of our society, which incorporates itself seamlessly into the fabric of that society.  Perhaps, too, in spite of the increasing rate of growth of pansexuality among females that the most recent surveys suggest, this will eventually level off, leaving the majority of the female population still generally heterosexual in orientation, although no longer rigidly so, with the ultimate consequence that while many will have interesting dating histories, most will still follow in the tradition of their mothers and grandmothers, forming long-term relationships with men.

 

The glamorization and popularization of female homoeroticism continues to expand, in movies, television, television commercials, and has even breached the bounds of pornography on the internet to more mainstream websites, like YouTube, with “hot girls kissing” videos and the like.  To what extent the expansion of this phenomenon continues is anyone’s guess, but I believe that it is here to stay, as a permanent feature of our cultural landscape.  I wonder, though, if there will be a backlash to some aspects of the phenomenon, at least where pornography is involved.  Even feminists who believe that female sexual fluidity is a form of empowerment may conclude that its furtherance by pornography has turned out to be a Faustian bargain with the devil, because in doing so it has only increased the sexual objectification of women.  And those in Gen Z, who have become famous – or infamous – in their intolerance for even the expression of ideas that they consider to be illiberal, may eventually push for the regulation or even banning of internet pornography.  Of course this, too, could have negative collateral consequences, if it opens the door to the sort of internet censorship that is now common in totalitarian countries like China.

 

As an aging Baby Boomer, I have had the luxury of following this trend in female sexuality with a detached fascination.  I can only wonder what kind of society awaits the men of future generations.  (I should mention that while most of the studies that I cited showed no significant trends in male sexual preferences within their survey periods, a comparison across the studies over time suggests that the male population, too, is undergoing a transition to greater sexual fluidity, with the only difference between the sexes being that the female population is undergoing the transition at a much faster rate.)  And while I may have little or no personal stake in the outcome, I still peruse any new publication of sexual surveys like the ones I have described here with unbounded curiosity.  They seem to describe a social transformation underway of potentially seismic proportions, but one which is rarely openly discussed.


Postscript (7/21/2024):

As I mentioned in the concluding paragraph above: I continue to track these sexual surveys with much interest.  A recent one done by Gallup illustrates very starkly the trends that I was describing:


What is particularly intriguing about these trends is that they seem to turn on its head a popular truism: that an individual's sexual preference is "hard-wired" into him or her at a very early age - perhaps even at or before birth.  This data clearly suggests that social and media influences - which presumably have a greater effect on the young - can and do have an impact upon sexual preference, and perhaps sexual identity as well.  I can think of no other plausible explanation for the exponential growth trends in most of these categories, other than perhaps that the diet of hormone-laden factory farm foods fed to our children in recent decades is affecting their socio-sexual development.